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Mondora: The Public Policy Exception, "The Freedom of Speech, or of the Pr

NOTE
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION, "THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OR OF THE PRESS," AND
THE UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("1962
Act") was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("N.C.C.U.S.L.") in 1962.1 The drafters hoped that
states would codify the 1962 Act's rules, long applied by the majority of
American courts, for recognition of foreign money-judgments in state

courts.2 The 1962 Act has since been enacted by twenty-eight states.
In 2005, the N.C.C.U.S.L. drafted the Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act ("2005 Act").4 The drafters hoped

1. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (approved by the N.C.C.U.S.L. in

1962), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 39 (2002) [hereinafter 1962 UNIF. ACT].
2. 1962 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 40 (2002) (Prefatory Note).
3. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100-.180 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-62-101 to -109 (2007);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-30 to -38 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4801-4808
(West 2006); D.C. CODE §§ 15-381 to -388 (2001 & Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.601-.607
(2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-110 to -117 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658C-1 to -9 (Supp.
2007); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-618 to -626 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 626B.I626B.8 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8501-8509 (2003); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-701 to -709 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.35 (West 2000); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 511.770-.787 (West Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-601 to -609 (2007);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:49A-16 to -24 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-4B-1 to -9 (West
2003); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ IC-1800 to -1808 (2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-20.2-01 to -06 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90-.94 (West 2004);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.200-.255 (West
2003 & Supp. 2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 22001-22009 (West Supp. 2007); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-.008 (Vernon 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-465.6 to -465.13
(2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6.40.010-.915 (West 1995).
4. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 5
(Supp. 2007) [hereinafter 2005 UNIF. ACT]. The official archive site for the National Conference of
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that the 2005 Act would continue the basic policy and approach of the
1962 Act, while at the same time updating, clarifying, and correcting
provisions of the 1962 Act. 5 The 2005 Act6 has since been enacted by
four states, with more states likely to follow.
This Note focuses upon the public policy exception to the
recognition of foreign-country money judgments contained within both
the 1962 and 2005 Acts, specifically, the changes made by the 2005 Act
to this exception. The 1962 Act's public policy exception states the rule
that a foreign judgment need not be recognized by a state court if "the
[cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state."7 The 2005 Act's public
policy exception states the rule that a foreign judgment need not be
recognized by a state court if "the judgment or the [cause of action]
[claim for relief] on which the judgment is based
is repugnant to the
8
public policy of this state or of the United States."
The drafters of the 2005 Act sought to align the public policy
exception with the vast majority of cases interpreting the 1962 Act's
public policy exception. 9 Importantly, the Commentary to the 2005 Act

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws may be found at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/archives/ulc/ulc.htm.
5. 2005 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. 11,at 5 (Supp. 2007) (Prefatory Note) ("[The 1962]
Act codified the most prevalent common law rules with regard to the recognition of money
judgments rendered in other countries.... It delineates a minimum of foreign-country judgments
that must be recognized by the courts of the adopting states, leaving those courts free to recognize
other foreign-country money judgments not covered by the Act under principles of comity or
otherwise."); see also National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Summary of
the
Uniform
Foreign-Country
Money
Judgments
Recognition
Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactsummaries/uniformacts-s-ufcmjra.asp (last visited May
26, 2008) [hereinafter Summary of 2005 Act] (providing a short summary of the primary
differences between the 1962 and the 2005 Uniform Acts).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1713-1724 (West Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 10-1401
to -1410 (Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 691.1131-.1143 (2008) (effective Mar. 7, 2008),

available at http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-Act-20-of-2008; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17.700-.820 (West Supp. 2008). Most states enacting versions of the 2005 Act to replace
previously enacted versions of the 1962 Act provide that "[tihe former [1962 Act] applies to all
actions commenced before the effective date of [the 2005 Act] in which the issue of recognition of a
foreign-country judgment is raised." E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1724(b) (West Supp. 2008). For
an
updated
listing
of
states
that
have
enacted
the
2005
Act,
see
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufcmjra.asp (last visited May
26, 2008).
7. 1962 UNIF. ACT § 4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. 11,at 59 (2002).
8. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(c)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at II (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
9. 2005 UNIF. ACT §4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007); see Sari Louis Feraud
Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 2007); Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237
F. Supp. 2d 394, 432-33, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d
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cited Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications,Inc.'o as the representative
case for determining whether a judgment is repugnant to the public
policy of the United States." I In Bachchan, a British libel judgment was
denied recognition under the public policy exception of New York's
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act because the
substantive law underlying the foreign money judgment violated the
First Amendment. 12 In so doing, the court held that if the foreign libel
judgment was repugnant to public policy because it violated
constitutional standards embodied in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution or the free speech guaranty of the New York
Constitution, the refusal to recognize the judgment was deemed to be
"'constitutionally mandatory.'"13

The public policy exception to the recognition of foreign money
4
judgments has been described as problematically under-theorized.'
Indeed, prior scholars have deemed it unsafe to delve into the meaning
of the exception. 15 Nevertheless, the following discussion will show that
the 2005 Act's statutory reliance upon Bachchan is inappropriate
because the history behind the public policy exception, and the modem
ambivalence regarding its use, dictates that courts should not invoke the
exception to provide categorical, constitutionally mandatory nonrecognition of foreign money judgments. This argument is particularly
important in light of the fact that a number of states will soon enact and

230, 249 (Md. 1997); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (Sup. Ct.
1992). The addition of judgment to the provision in the 2005 Act was intended to expand the
exception to cases where either the cause of action or judgment itself was found to violate public
policy. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007).
10. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
II. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A.pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007).
12. 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
13. Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
14. Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American " Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 783, 798 (2004).
15. See Horace Emerson Read, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
Common Law Units of the British Commonwealth, in 2 HARVARD STUDIES INTHE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 288 (1938) (describing the public policy exception to Foreign Judgment Enforcement as "'a
dangerous horse to ride,"' and warning that it is unsafe to attempt to delimit the exception's scope).
Prior unsafe discussions of the exception include Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
795 (1996); Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovem, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956); Note, The Public Policy Concept in the Conflict of Laws, 33 COLUM.
L. REV. 508 (1933); Jonathan H. Pittman, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 969 (1989).
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begin to 16interpret the 2005 Act and its expanded public policy
exception.
Part II of this Note will begin by discussing the recognition of
foreign money judgments generally, before turning to the public policy
exception, Bachchan, and the Second Circuit's recent reliance on
Bachchan in Sarl Louis FeraudInt'l v. Viewfinder, Inc.17 Part III will
then provide an overview of the recent ambivalent, scholarly reactions to
Bachchan's constitutionally mandatory language in order to show that
the Commentary to the 2005 Act made an inappropriate choice in citing
to Bachchan as the representative case for determining whether a foreign
judgment is repugnant to the public policy of the United States. The
public policy exception contained within the American Law Institute's
("ALl") recently proposed federal statute for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments' 8 will be discussed, as will three
scholarly reactions to the Bachchan line of cases: the State Action
argument,19 the Cosmopolitan argument,2 ° and the Separate
Considerations argument.2'
16. Indeed, the practical importance of the public policy exception will only increase as
American free speech protections collide with foreign judgments arising out of online (Internet)
activities. See THE A.L.I., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS

AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 79-80 reporters' note 6(d) (Proposed Final Draft April 11, 2005)
[hereinafter A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT); Molly S. Van Houweling, Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, The First Amendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the Next Yahoo! v. LICRA, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 716 (2003) ("The Internet... raises the stakes for domestic enforcement of
foreign judgments," as well as the "public policy safety valve.").
17. 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
18.

THE FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, in A.L.I. PROPOSED

FINAL DRAFT, supra note 16, at 7. For further discussion on the A.L.I. Act, see Thomas S.
Leatherbury, ALI Takes Position on Foreign Judgments (Including Those Against the Media),
COMM. LAW., Summer 2005, at 25; Katherine R. Miller, PlaygroundPolitics:Assessing the Wisdom
of Writing a Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. InternationalRecognition and Enforcement Law, 35
GEO. J. INT'L L. 239 (2004); Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challengefor
the ALl: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute,
75 IND. L.J. 635 (2000) (Professors Silberman and Lowenfeld were the co-Reporters for the A.L.I.
Act). The A.L.I. Act has thus far failed to be enacted into federal legislation.
19. Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 186 (2004) (arguing that
constitutional analysis within the public policy exception is inappropriate because there is no state
action in the enforcement of Un-American Judgments). But see Montre D. Carodine, Political
Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1159, 1237 (2007)
(discussing the Bachchan line of cases and arguing that the courts are correct to find that the state
action doctrine precludes them from enforcing unconstitutional foreign judgments).
20. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819, 1868 (2005) (arguing that courts
interpreting the public policy exception should weigh the overall systemic interest in creating an
interlocking system of international adjudication against the forum's public policy).
21. See Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! v. L.C.R.A.: Private
Law, Constitutional Review, and InternationalConflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2139-
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Part IV will then examine the statutory history behind the 1962 and
2005 Acts, including the legislative history behind the 1962 Act's
enactment in New York. The discussion will show that the public policy
exception to the recognition of foreign money judgments, regardless of
whether the public policy is that of the state or United States, should be
interpreted narrowly and invoked only as a discretionary safety valve to
protect against judgments that sufficiently violate fundamental notions
of what is decent and just, so as to clearly show that recognition would
seriously undermine "'that sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen
ought to feel.,, 22 As such, this Note will argue that there is no statutory
or historical basis for a constitutionally mandatory, categorical public
policy exception to the recognition of foreign money judgments.2 3
In Part V, a statutory amendment to the 2005 Act will be proposed,
with the belief that its inclusion in state versions of the 2005 Act can
alleviate the problems inherent in Bachchan by separating the public
policy exception from First Amendment analysis. 24 This part will then
argue that the Second Circuit's analysis in Viewfinder 25 is entirely
appropriate if utilized to interpret the proposed amendment, not the
public policy exception. Finally, this Note will argue that courts
interpreting the 2005 Act-as enacted by the N.C.C.U.S.L.-should
incorporate constitutional principles into the public policy exception,
rather than allow the public policy exception to be subsumed by
constitutional analysis. The discussion will then apply this suggested
approach to the facts of Viewfinder. In so doing, the analysis will also
attempt to reconcile the belief that the First Amendment does not

40 (2004) (arguing that constitutional norms and public policy analysis are both relevant to the
recognition of foreign judgments, but should not become coterminous).
22. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007) (quoting Hunt v. BP
Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex. 1980)); see infra Part IV.
23. See Berman, supra note 20, at 1872 ("[T]here is no basis for a categorical [public policy
exception] preventing enforcement ....
");Rosen, supra note 19, at 172 ("Categorically refusing to
enforce [foreign libel judgments under the exception] is tantamount to imposing U.S. constitutional
norms on foreign countries."); Jeremy Maltby, Note, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The
Enforcement of Foreign Libel Judgments in US. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1978, 2023 (1994)
(arguing that courts should resist the reflex to summarily deny recognition to foreign libel
judgments).
24. A similar amendment was introduced into both houses of the New York legislature in
January 2008. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
25. 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
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directly preclude the recognition of foreign judgments2 6 with the belief
27
that public policy may be found by examining constitutional norms.
II.

THE U.S. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS AND THE
MOVEMENT TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATORY PUBLIC

POLICY EXCEPTION

A.

Comity, the U.S. Recognition of ForeignJudgments, and the
Uniform Acts

Much has been written on the U.S. recognition of foreign
judgments, 28 and many of these discussions begin with the doctrine of
comity and the seminal Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot.29 This

has been the case for two reasons: First, in discussing the public policy

26. See Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 239, 249 (Md. 1997) (denying recognition to
a foreign libel judgment on public policy grounds without deciding whether the First Amendment
directly precluded recognition).
27. See id. at 239 ("[I]n ascertaining ... public policy, it is appropriate to examine and rely
upon the history, policies, and requirements of the First Amendment .... In determining nonconstitutional principles of law, courts often rely upon the policies and requirements reflected in
constitutional provisions."); Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 739 N.E.2d 1263,
1270 (II1. 2000); Martino v. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc., 554 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 688 (N.Y. 1985); see also KATHLEEN
PATCHEL, STUDY REPORT ON POSSIBLE AMENDMENT OF THE UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-

JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION
ACT
32
n.164
(June
25,
2003),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufmjra/apr2004studyreport.pdf ("In general, courts have
recognized that the public policy of the forum state includes the public policy of the United Statesthat is, those policies reflected in the Constitution .... ).
28. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In
Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 253, 255 (1991)
(discussing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments). For a historical overview of
scholarly articles on the U.S. recognition of foreign judgments, see Saad Gul, Old Rulesfor a New
World? The Constitutional Underpinnings of U.S. Foreign Judgment Enforcement Doctrine, 5
APPALACHIAN J.L. 67 (2006); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of
ForeignAdjudications: A Survey anda Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601 (1968); Willis
L. M. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783
(1950); and Hessel E. Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33
MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1935).
29. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). The classic definition of comity comes from Hilton v. Guyot:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64. Not surprisingly, his definition has been described as overly ambiguous. See Joel R.
Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,9-11 (1991).
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30
exception courts often refer to and even rely on the doctrine of comity;
modem jurisprudence originated out of
second, comity's importance in
31
the Court's decision in Hilton.
In Hilton, the Court formulated its test for foreign judgment
recognition and enforcement:

[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own
country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the
merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon
the judgment, be tried afresh .... 32

Hilton's comity-based test viewed recognition of the full effect of33a
foreign judgment as an obligation if its test (plus reciprocity) was met.
30. See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
("It is plaintiff's position that the public policy exception to the rule that foreign judgments are
afforded comity is narrow ....
31. 159U.S.atl13.
32. Id. at 202-03 (emphasis added). Note that the "special reason" clause may be said to
include judgments repugnant to the public policy of the forum.
33. The court subsequently held against the plaintiff because there was a "want of
reciprocity," a requirement not included in its test. See id at 228; Carodine, supra note 19, at 1167
n.24. Reciprocity in foreign judgment recognition is the recognition by country A of a country B
judgment only if, and only to the extent that country B would recognize an identical country A
judgment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (8th ed. 2004) (defining reciprocity as it relates to
intellectual property). The 1962 Act and the 2005 Act do not require reciprocity. For a discussion of
both sides of the reciprocity debate, see J. Noelle Hicks, FacilitatingInternationalTrade: The U.S.
Needs FederalLegislation Governing the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 155, 176 (2002) (arguing that if the U.S. requires reciprocity other countries will realize that they
need to be more receptive to enforcing U.S. judgments); Miller, supra note 18, at 242 (arguing that
a reciprocity requirement is neither wise nor warranted in U.S. foreign judgment recognition);
Franklin 0. Ballard, Comment, Turnabout Is Fair Play: Why a Reciprocity Requirement Should Be
Included in the American Law Institute's ProposedFederal Statute, 28 HoUS. J. INT'L L. 199, 23738 (2006) (arguing in favor of a reciprocity requirement); and Susan L. Stevens, Note, Commanding
International Judicial Respect: Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 115, 117 (2002) ("[T]he United States ought to
enact a federal statute with a reciprocity requirement, in order to prevent foreign country neglect of
U.S. judgments."). For a discussion of the recognition of U.S. judgments abroad, see ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (Charles Platto & William G. Horton eds., 2d ed. 1993)
(setting forth the laws and procedures for the enforcement of foreign judgments in more than 35
jurisdictions); Alessandro Barzaghi, Recognition and Enforcement of United States Judgments in
Italy, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 61 (2005); Yves P. Piantino, Recognition and Enforcement of Money
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Indeed, the widely recognized modem basis for the comity doctrine is
that of obligation, requiring United States courts to defer to foreign
sovereigns and the executive in the conduct of foreign relations.3 4 The
Hilton Court's deference to foreign tribunals and emphasis upon
procedural protections mirrors Justice Cardozo's belief that "[w]e are
of a problem is wrong
not so provincial as to say that every solution
3 5
because we deal with it otherwise at home.
The doctrine of comity remains significant in the modem context of
foreign judgment recognition, 6 and Hilton's test has remained a
relevant, even canonical piece of foreign judgment jurisprudence. As
such, part of Hilton's test can be explicitly seen in the 1962 Act. 7
The drafters of the 1962 Act hoped that states would codify its rules
on recognition of foreign money judgments, thereby making it more
likely that judgments rendered by U.S. courts would be recognized
abroad.3 8 To help achieve this goal the drafters emphasized that state
courts were privileged to give foreign money judgments greater, not less,
effect than the local forum was required to do by the provisions of the
Act.

39

The drafters of the 2005 Act hoped that the Act would continue the
basic policies and approach of the 1962 Act, while at the same time
updating, clarifying, and correcting provisions of the 1962 Act.4 0
Accordingly, the drafters intended the 2005 Act to codify the most
prevalent common law rules with regard to the recognition of money
judgments rendered in other countries. 41 The 2005 Act thus delineated
Judgments Between the United States and Switzerland: An Analysis of the Legal Requirements and
Case Law, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L, 91 (1997); and Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition
and Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 175 (2005).
34. See Paul, supra note 29, at 12,25-26.
35. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
36. See Carodine, supra note 19, at 1233 ("It is important to remember that foreign judgment
recognition in this country is based on principles of comity."); Mark L. Movsesian, Judging
International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 71 (2007) (noting that American courts make
recognition and enforcement determinations based on a "comity theory"). But see Reese, supra note
28, at 784 ("Comity, a word of loose and uncertain meaning at best, has little significance in
(foreign judgment recognition] other than as a statement of the conflict of laws rules of the
forum.").
37. 1962 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt., 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 59 (2002) (citing Hilton directly); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987) (citing Hilton's
procedural requirements).
38. 1962 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 40 (2002) (Prefatory Note).
39. Id.
40. 2005 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 5 (Supp. 2007) (Prefatory Note); see also
Summary of 2005 Act, supra note 5 (providing a short summary of the primary differences between
the 1962 and the 2005 Uniform acts).
41. 2005 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 5 (Supp. 2007) (Prefatory Note).
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the minimum standards for a foreign-country judgment to be recognized
by the courts of the adopting states, leaving those courts free to expand
recognition and enforcement to other foreign-country money judgments
not covered by the Act under principles of comity or otherwise.4 2
One of the provisions that was updated and clarified in the 2005
Act was the public policy exception. The 2005 Act's public policy
exception, contained in section 4 ("Standards for Recognition of
Foreign-Country Judgment"), part (c)(3) reads: "A court of this state
need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if:

...the

judgment or

the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based
is
43
repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States.
The 2005 Act, by including both "the judgment," and "or of the
United States" in the language of the exception, thereby made two
changes to the 1962 Act's public policy exception." By adding "the
judgment" to the exception, the drafters hoped to eliminate the tendency
of some courts to narrowly hold that only public policy challenges based
on foreign causes of action could be found repugnant under the Act.45 In
addition, the drafters also expanded the exception to provide for nonrecognition of those foreign money judgments that were found to be
repugnant to the public policy of the United States.46 The drafters
wanted to make it clear "that the relevant public policy is that of both the
State in which recognition is sought and that of the United States. 47 The
drafters cited Bachchan 48 as the representative case for determining
42. Id Recognition of a foreign money judgment by a state court under the 2005 Act precedes
enforcement of that judgment. Specifically, if the court finds that the foreign money judgment is
entitled to recognition under the Act, then the foreign judgment is enforceable to the same extent as
a judgment rendered in "this state." 2005 UNIF. ACT § 7(2), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 16 (Supp. 2007); see
also Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 889 n.9 (4th Cir. 1992) (arguing that in the interest of
comity, there may be instances where courts should recognize a foreign judgment, but not enforce
it); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. b (1987) (distinguishing
recognition from enforcement).
43. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(c)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 11 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
44. Compare 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(c)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at II (Supp. 2007), with 1962 UNIF.
ACT § 4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. II at 59 ("[T]he [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state ....
").
45. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007) ("Subsection 4(c)(3)
rejects this narrow focus by providing that the forum court may deny recognition if either the cause
of action or the judgment itself violates public policy."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d) (1987) (providing that "the cause of action on which the
judgment was based, or the judgment itself," may be subject to non-recognition under the
exception).
46. See 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007) ("This is the position
taken by the vast majority of cases interpreting the 1962 public policy provision.").
47. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. I1,
at 13 (Supp. 2007).
48. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
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whether a judgment was repugnant to the public policy of the United
States.49
B. Bachchan and the ConstitutionallyMandatory Public Policy
Exception to Recognizing Foreign-CountryMoney Judgments
In Bachchan, the plaintiff, an Indian national, filed a defamation
suit in England against the New York operator of a news service that
transmitted reports only to a news service in India. 50 The story at issue
was written in London, wired by defendant to India, and reported in two
newspapers that were subsequently distributed in the United Kingdom.5 1
The English jury held for plaintiff and assessed forty thousand pounds in
story, plus attorneys' fees against the
damages for the wire service
52
defendant, India Abroad, Inc.
Plaintiff thereafter filed suit in New York under Section 5303 of the
C.P.L.R.-the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition
Act. 53 The defendant responded by arguing that the judgment was
repugnant to public policy and thereby not subject to recognition under
Section 5304(b)(4) of the C.P.L.R.5 4 According to the defendant, the
foreign libel judgment was repugnant to public policy because it was
imposed upon him without the safeguards for freedom of speech and the

49. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007) ("The language 'or of the
United States' in subsection 4(c)(3)... makes it clear that the relevant public policy is that of both
the State... and that of the United States.... E.g., Bachchan .. "). Interestingly, a June 2004
memo by the Drafting Committee for the 2005 Uniform Act stated that despite the addition of
United States policy, the standard for invoking the exception remained unchanged. Memorandum
from the Drafting Comm. to Amend the Unif Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act to the
2004),
(June
7,
8
. Comm'rs
Unif
Law
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufmjra/2004AnnMtgRpt.pdf. Public policy would be
violated only "if the substance of the law is inimical to good morals, natural justice, or the general
interest of the citizens of the state." Id. at 8. Shortly thereafter, the Reporter's Notes to a Draft
Uniform Act, dated October 2004, cited to Bachchan's constitutionally mandated invocation of the
public policy exception as an example of a judgment repugnant to United States policy. UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY

MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, reporter's notes (Oct. 2004

Discussion Draft), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufmjra/Oct2004MtgDraft.pdf The
reporter's notes and comments of subsequent draft uniform acts also cited Bachchan. UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, reporter's notes (Mar. 2005
UNIF.
Meeting Draft), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufmjra/2005MarMtgDraft.pdf;
FOREIGN-COUNTRY

MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, cmt. 8 (July 2005 Draft),

http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufmjra/2005annmtgdraft.pdf
50. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
51. Id. The story was also reported in an issue of defendant's New York newspaper. Id.
52. Id.at 662.
53. See id; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5303 (McKinney 1997).
54. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
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press required by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Constitution. 55
The court held in favor of the defendant and denied recognition of
the foreign judgment. In so doing, the court wrote,
[I]f... the public policy to which the foreign judgment is repugnant is
embodied in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or
the free speech guaranty of the Constitution of this State, the refusal to
recognize the judgment should
be, and it is deemed to be,
56
"constitutionallymandatory."

The court thus decided that it did not have discretion under the Act
to recognize the judgment if the foreign judgment or cause of action
failed to comport with U.S. Constitutional standards for adjudicating
libel claims.57 Because of the differences in English libel law as
compared to U.S. libel law,5 8 the court found that the foreign judgment
must be unenforceable under the public policy exception because it
violated the defendant's First Amendment rights to free speech and
freedom of the press; 59 that is, the public policy exception was subject to
"constitutionally mandatory" application in all cases seeking recognition
of English libel law judgments where the substantive law underlying
those judgments violated the First Amendment.
C. From Libel to Fair Use: Viewfinder
In the recent Second Circuit case, Sarl Louis FeraudInternational
v. Viewfinder, Inc.,6° the court relied heavily on Bachchan to effectively
mirror the approach suggested by the drafters of the 2005 Act. In
Viewfinder, the defendant was a website operator, incorporated in
Delaware, with its principal place of business in New York.61
Defendant's website contained photographs of current and past fashions,
including photographs taken of fashion shows held by various

55. Id.
56. Id.(emphasis added).
57. See id. at 662-64.
58. For an abbreviated discussion on the differences between American and English libel law,
see Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S.
Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 235, 239-44 (1993-1994); Gregory T. Walters,
Comment, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.: The Clash Between Protection of Free
Speech in the United States and GreatBritain, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 895, 930-32 (1992-1993).
59. See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662-65.
60. 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
61. Id.at476.
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designers.62 The plaintiffs in the case were French designers, and
photographs of plaintiffs' fashion shows were among those featured on
the site.63 Plaintiffs filed suit in France seeking money damages from
64
Viewfinder, alleging the unauthorized use of their intellectual property
and unfair competition. 65 Viewfinder failed to respond and a default
French judgment was entered against it, ordering Viewfinder to remove
the offending photographs from the site and fining Viewfinder in the
amount of 500,000 francs per plaintiff, with a 50,000 franc fine per day
that Viewfinder failed to comply with the judgment.66
Plaintiffs then filed suit in the Southern District of New York
seeking enforcement of the French money judgment under the New
York Act.67 The district court held that enforcing the French judgments
would be repugnant to the public policy of New York because it would
violate Viewfinder's First Amendment rights. 68 The Second Circuit
granted plaintiffs appeal and subsequently vacated and remanded the
case back to the district court for further proceedings specific to the
public policy exception and copyright's fair use doctrine.69
In making its decision the Second Circuit wrote extensively on the
proper application of the public policy exception within New York.7 °
The court first determined that the judgment against Viewfinder was not
repugnant to New York public policy due to the difference between U.S.
and French copyright law; that is, dress designs are copyrightable in
France, but not in the United States. 7' The court then moved on to
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. United States copyright law does not extend protection to clothes or dress designs. Id. at
480 n.3 (citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d. Cir. 1995)). Under French
copyright law, clothing designs are entitled to copyright protection. Id. at 479 (French citation
omitted).
65. Id. at 477.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1997).
68. See Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), vacated, 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
69. SarI Louis Feraud Int'l v.Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 484 (2d Cir. 2007).
70. Id. at 479-80; see infra Part IV.C. In New York, the "public policy inquiry rarely results
in refusal to enforce a judgment unless it is 'inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to
the prevailing moral sense."' Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 479 (quoting Sung Hwan Co. v. Rite Aid
Corp., 850 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 2006)); see also Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("A judgment is unenforceable as against public policy to the extent that it is 'repugnant
to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.' The
standard is high, and infrequently met.") (citation omitted).
71. Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 480 n.3. The Viewfinder court deferred to the district court's
holding that "copyright laws [were] not 'matters of strong moral principle' but rather represente[d]
'economic legislation"' subject to economic policy. Id.
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discuss the relationship between the public policy exception and
Viewfinder's First Amendment rights.
The court restated Bachchan's holding that foreign judgments that
impinge on First Amendment rights will be found to be "repugnant" to
public policy. 72 The court then laid out a two step test for determining
whether the foreign money judgment was repugnant to the public policy
of New York: First, courts must identify the First Amendment
protections deemed constitutionally mandatory for the speech at issue;
second, courts must determine whether the substantive foreign laws
underlying the foreign judgment provide comparable protections.73
The court then wrote that because the foreign judgment was based
upon alleged copyright infringement, the proper prism to analyze the
First Amendment claims was through copyright's fair use doctrine. 74
After summarizing the United States' fair use doctrine, the court
indicated that if Viewfinder's use was found to be a fair use under
United States copyright law, then the French foreign money judgments
were to be held repugnant to the public policy of New York.75 The
court's analysis in Viewfinder therefore expanded the invocation of
Bachchan's categorical, "constitutionally mandatory" public policy
exception to deny recognition to foreign judgments that impinged on the
First Amendment rights protected by copyright's fair use doctrine.
III.

THE SCHOLARLY REACTION

Despite the foreign judgment recognition jurisprudence outlined
above,76 there has been a recent movement by the academic community
criticizing the categorical, constitutionally mandatory application of the

72. Id. at 480 (citing Bachchan v, India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (Sup. Ct.
1992); Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1189-90 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).
73. Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 481-82. According to the Second Circuit, the district court should
have first determined the level of First Amendment protection required by New York public policy,
and second, it should have analyzed whether the French intellectual property regime underlying the
foreign judgment provided comparable protections to Viewfinder's First Amendment rights. Id.
74. Id. at 482. "'We have repeatedly rejected First Amendment challenges to injunctions from
copyright infringement on the ground that First Amendment concerns are protected by and
coextensive with the fair use doctrine."' Id. (quoting Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus.
Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999)).
75. See id. at 483 ("If the publication of photographs of copyrighted material in the same
manner as Viewfinder has done in this case would not be fair use under United States law, then the
French intellectual property regime sanctioning the same conduct certainly would not be repugnant
to public policy.").
76. See supra Part II.B-C.
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public policy exception in the Bachchan line of cases.77 This Part will
discuss the academic ambivalence over the current state of the exception
by examining the history behind the public policy exception contained
within the ALI's recently proposed federal statute for foreign judgment
recognition and enforcement, as well as three specific scholarly reactions
to the Bachchan line of cases. The discussion will thereby show that the
2005 Act's citation to Bachchan as the representative case for
determining whether a judgment is repugnant to U.S. public policy was a
dubious, even inappropriate choice.
A. The Public Policy Exception to ForeignJudgment Recognition,
Bachchan and the ALl
In 2005, the American Law Institute approved a proposed federal
statute entitled the Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act
("A.L.I. Act").7 8 The A.L.I. Act was drafted with the belief that a federal
statute could achieve nationwide uniformity in the American law of
foreign judgment recognition. 79 The drafters of the A.L.I. Act also
believed that federal legislation would stimulate agreements with foreign
countries pertaining to reciprocal enforcement of each others'
judgments, while providing clarity and incentives to foreign countries
and their courts to recognize and enforce judgments emanating from the
United States.8 °
The A.L.I. Act contained a public policy exception that read:
A foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in
the United States if the party resisting recognition or enforcement
establishes that... the judgment or the claim on which the judgment is
77.

See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET. AL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1335 n.12 (4th ed. 2004); Berman,

supra note 20, at 1872 ("[T]here is no basis for a categorical [public policy exception] preventing
enforcement .... "); Rosen, supra note 19, at 172 ("Categorically refusing to enforce [foreign
judgments under the exception] is tantamount to imposing U.S. constitutional norms on foreign
countries."); Craig A. Stem, Foreign Judgments and the Freedom of Speech: Look Who 's Talking,
60 BROOK. L. REv. 999 (1994) (arguing that Bachchan made a collection of errors, including
misconstruing the First Amendment); Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status ofAmerican Law in the
Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1283, 1305-06 (1998) (stating that the
public policy exception should not be used to strike down every foreign judgment that shows any
deviation from the accepted First Amendment protections for free speech); Maltby, supra note 23,
at 2023 (arguing that courts-should resist the reflex to summarily deny recognition to foreign libel
judgments); Walters, supra note 58, at 899 (arguing that future enforcement of non-U.S. libel
judgments should be subject to constitutional analysis on a case by case basis); infra Part II.B.
78. THE A.L.I., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006) [hereinafter A.L.I. PROPOSED STATUTE].
79. A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT,supra note 16, at 1.
80. See id. at 6.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/18

14

Mondora: The Public Policy Exception, "The Freedom of Speech, or of the Pr
20081

PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

based is repugnant to the public policy of the United States, or to the
public policy of a particular state of the United States when
the
8
relevant legal interest, right, or policy is regulated by state law. 1
The statutory history of the A.L.I. Act's public policy exception
may be traced back through the Reports and Annual Proceedings of the
A.L.I.82 Initially the Reporters for the A.L.I. Act favored a narrow
interpretation to the public policy exception, quoting Justice Cardozo's
famous definition of public policy as a violation of "some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal. 83 By 2002, the discussion of the public
policy exception had expanded beyond Loucks to include the First

Amendment line of cases.8 4 The A.L.I.'s discussion at the 2002 annual
meeting thus centered upon whether it was appropriate to balance the
public policy in favor of free speech against the public policy favoring
enforcement.8 5
In 2003, Professor Linda Silberman, who along with Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld acted as Reporters for the A.L.I. Act, posited that
there may be no rationale for invoking the public policy exception as
repugnant to United States' policy if the U.S. or a particular state does
not have a sufficiently high interest in the judgment's recognition. 86 In
further discussions in 2003 regarding the public policy exception, it was
suggested that the A.L.I. explicitly uphold the Bachchan line of cases in
the statute itself rather than "explicitly or implicitly trying to overrule
those cases and cast doubt on those cases refusing to enforce on [First

81. The FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 5(a)(vi), in A.L.I.
PROPOSED STATUTE, supra note 78. Note that the public policy exception within the A.L.I. Act
provides mandatory, rather than discretionary, grounds for non-recognition.
82. A.L.I. Proceedings 2005, Discussion of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Analysis and ProposedFederalStatute, 82 A.L.I. PROC. 94, 127-30 (2006) [hereinafter
2005 Proceedings]; A.L.I. Proceedings 2003, Discussion of International Jurisdiction and
Judgments Project, 80 A.L.I. PROC. 109, 139-46 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 Proceedings]; A.L.I.
Proceedings 2002, Discussionof InternationalJurisdictionand Judgments Project,79 A.L.I. PROC.
328, 359, 365 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 Proceedings]; AM. LAW INST., INT'L JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS PROJECT: REPORT 26-28 (APRIL 14, 2000) [hereinafter A.L.I. INT'L JUDGMENTS
REPORT].
83. A.L.I. INT'L JUDGMENTS REPORT, supra note 82, at 27 (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918) (Cardozo, J.)); see infra Part IV.C.
84. 2002 Proceedings, supra note 82, at 359.
85. See id. at 365. Professor Brand of the A.L.I. expressly rejected the notion of balancing and
instead observed that, "I find it hard to believe that the public policy emanating from the
Constitution will not always trump the public policy in favor of enforcement ....IId.
86. 2003 Proceedings, supra note 82, at 142; see also Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 18,
at 644.
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Amendment grounds]. 87 In 2005, the A.L.I.'s discussion of the public
policy safety valve 88 again focused upon the First Amendment line of
cases, this time regarding 89
how much weight they should be given in the
Commentary.
A.L.I. Act's
The Commentary to the final A.L.I. Act emphasized that the
threshold for invocation of the public policy exception was set at a very
high level, 90 and the Reporters' Notes further stated that the scope of the
public policy exception was meant to be extremely narrow. 91 In response
to the First Amendment discussions, the Commentary to the A.L.I. Act
acknowledged that recent American cases had invoked the exception to
deny enforcement of foreign libel judgments. 92 Importantly however, the
Reporters' Notes to the A.L.I. Act did not take a position on Bachchan's
constitutionally mandatory public policy exception, but instead chose to
highlight the two main issues it believed arose out of the Bachchan line
of decisions. First, whether there were some foreign judgments that
would not pass muster under the First Amendment but that did not rise
to the level of "'repugnan[ce] to the public policy of the United
States.' ' 93 Second, "whether a territorial connection or nexus with
American interests other than the presence of assets in the United States
should be necessary to trigger the public-policy exception in American
courts.

94

87. 2003 Proceedings, supra note 82, at 146 (quoting Professor Eric M. Freedman). In fact,
Professor Freedman "would have amended the Reporters' Note to state specifically that a libel
judgment obtained in violation of the First Amendment was in violation of fundamental United
States public policy." Leatherbury, supra note 18, at 25.
88. 2005 Proceedings, supra note 82, at 128.
89. Id. at 134. In response to the suggestion that the First Amendment be explicitly referred to
in the Comment as a vehicle for categorically invoking the public policy exception, Professor
Silberman aptly responded, "[qluite frankly, the circumstances and the facts as to when the First
Amendment public policy applies is an issue of some debate, which we highlight in the Notes." Id.
90. See A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 5 cmt. h, supra note 16, at 63.
91. The Notes specifically referenced both Justice Cardozo's definition of public policy in
Loucks and Professor Barbara Kulzer in describing the proper scope of the exception. See A.L.I.
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 5 reporter's note 6(a), supranote 16, at 72-74; infra Part IV.C.
92. See 2005 Proceedings, supranote 82, at 135.
93. A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 5 reporter's note 6(d), supra note 16, at 78; see infra
Part V.B.
94. See A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 5 reporter's note 6(d), supra note 16, at 78;
Silberman & Lowenfeld, supranote 18, at 644; infra Part V.B.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/18

16

Mondora: The Public Policy Exception, "The Freedom of Speech, or of the Pr
2008]

PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

B. The Academic Response to Bachchan and the FirstAmendment
Cases: State Action, the CosmopolitanApproach, and Separate
Considerations
The 2005 Act's reliance on Bachchan as the representative case for
determining whether a judgment is repugnant to the public policy of the
United States reflects both case law and the initial, generally positive,
scholarly response to Bachchan's "constitutionally mandatory" nonrecognition under the public policy exception. 95 Recently however, there
has been a backlash by the academic community against the Bachchan
line of cases. This section will briefly discuss three of these argumentsthe State Action argument, the Cosmopolitan argument, and the Separate
Considerations argument-to highlight the academic ambivalence over
the proper role of the public policy exception as it relates to the First
Amendment.
1. The State Action Argument
The first argument against Bachchan's categorical, constitutionally
mandatory non-recognition under the public policy exception has its
basis in State Action analysis.9 6 Under this view the First Amendment
does not preclude an American court from enforcing a foreign judgment,
despite the fact that the substantive law underlying the judgment may
impinge on rights protected by that amendment. 97 Instead, the substance
of the judgment being recognized would not be attributed to the forum
court for purposes of state action under Shelley v. Kraemer.98 There
would thus be no state action by the American court in recognizing the
foreign judgment "because the underlying legal right was not created by
95. See Carodine, supra note 19, at 1237 (arguing that the First Amendment line of cases
were correctly decided); Gregory J. Wrenn, CyberspaceIs Real, NationalBorders Are Fiction: The
Protectionof Expressive Rights Online Through Recognition of NationalBorders in Cyberspace, 38
STAN. J. INT'L L. 97, 106 (2002) ("The courts of the United States simply will not and cannot be
party to the enforcement of [foreign judgments] outside of the permissible bounds of the First
Amendment."); Youm, supra note 58, at 263-64 (describing Bachchan's importance to American
media); Eric P. Enson, Comment, A Roadblock on the Detour Around the FirstAmendment: Is the
Enforcement of English Libel Judgments in the United States Unconstitutional?,21 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 159, 183-84 (1999) (arguing that under both the First Amendment, and the state
action doctrine, the American enforcement of English libel judgments are unconstitutional); Jeff
Sanders, Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication of the First Amendment to Defamation Claims
Against American Media, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 515, 534-40 (1994) (arguing that the
Bachchan line of cases were correct to deny recognition to foreign judgments violating the First
Amendment).
96. SeeRosen, supranote 19, at 186-87.
97. See id.
at 186.
98. See id at 186-87; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
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an American polity." 99 Without this state action, recognition of foreign
libel judgments by American courts would not even raise constitutional
issues.100 According to the State Action argument then, constitutional
analysis within cases such as Bachchan is deemed 0wholly misplaced,
and the judgments should be recognized accordingly.1
2. The Cosmopolitan Argument
A second argument against Bachchan's categorical, constitutionally
mandatory non-recognition under the public policy exception proposed
that courts instead undertake a Cosmopolitan approach to the recognition
of foreign judgments. 10 2 Under this approach, courts could not simply
cite the First Amendment and refuse to recognize a foreign judgment
without considering the conflict's values implicated in recognizing the
decision. 103 Because of this added layer of analysis, there would be no
basis for Bachchan's
categorical public policy exception preventing
04
recognition.'
Under the Cosmopolitan approach, courts would have to seriously
consider the conflicts values that are effectuated when foreign judgments
are recognized, weigh the importance of such values against the forum's
public policy, and "then consider the degree to which the parties have
affiliated themselves with the forum." 10 5 Importantly, according to this
argument "constitutional considerations could conceivably generate
sufficient public policy reasons to refuse to enforce a [foreign]
judgment."' 1 6 However, before a recognition determination was made
the court would have to weigh the constitutionally affected public policy
"against the overall systemic interest in creating an interlocking system
of international adjudication."1' 0 7 This
balancing of interests would
10 8
normally tip in favor of recognition.

99. Rosen, supra note 19, at 186.
100. Id. at 188.
101. Seeid.
102. Berman, supra note 20, at 1868. Berman's article applied what he called a "cosmopolitan
vision" to the recognition of foreign judgments. Id.
103. See id.
at1879.
104. See id. at 1872.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1868.
108. Under the Cosmopolitan approach, "judgment recognition implicates an entirely distinct
setof concerns about the role of courts in a multistate world." Id.at 1869. Indeed, the judicial
"parochialism" in the Bachchan line of cases was a "cause for concern" under this approach, not a
cause to be championed. See id.
at 1872.
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3. The Separate Considerations Argument
According to yet another argument, Bachchan's categorical,
constitutionally mandatory non-recognition under the public policy
exception improperly merged constitutional review and the public policy
exception into one coterminous exception to recognizing foreign
judgments. 0 9 Under this Separate Considerations argument, the authors
believed that there were indeed facial similarities between courts
examining constitutional norms and courts examining fundamental
public policy considerations when deciding whether to recognize a
foreign judgment." However, despite this similarity, the authors
believed that constitutional norms and public policy considerations were
"separate categories, the distinction between which ought to be
maintained. ' 11
The authors also acknowledged that constitutional provisions could2
"influence and [even] give substance to fundamental public policies.""
Yet, the authors importantly observed that there was a marked difference
between the mandated application of constitutional norms, and the
discretion often granted courts in discerning their forum's fundamental
public policies. 113
IV.

THE NON-MANDATORY PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION UNDER THE
UNIFORM ACTS

This Part will show that there is no statutory or historical basis for a
categorical, constitutionally mandatory public policy exception to the
recognition of foreign money judgments under the 1962 and 2005 Acts
(and similar state versions of those Acts). This Part will begin by
examining two prior Foreign Judgment Acts relied on by the drafters of
the 1962 Act:" 4 the [British] Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act, and The Foreign (Money) Judgments Act. The
analysis will then trace the exception all the way back to articles written
by the draftsmen of the 1962 Act, Willis L. M. Reese and Kurt H.
Nadelmann." 5 Because the 1962 Act purported to codify state common
109. See Ben-Ezer & Bendor, supra note 21, at 2139-40.
110. See id. at 2140.
111. Id. This argument thus implicitly rejected Bachchan'scategorical public policy exception
preventing recognition. See id. at 2139-40 (referencing Bachchan as an example of a court merging
Constitutional and public policy analysis into a "coterminous" exception).
112. Id.at2140.
113.

Id.

114. 1962 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 41 (2002) (Prefatory Note).
115. See Reese, supra note 28; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money
Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 IOwA L. REv. 236 (1957).
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law rules, the history behind the 1962 Act's enactment in New York will
be examined. 1 6 Finally, the intent behind the 2005 Act's public policy
exception will be discussed." 7 This analysis will show that the public
policy exception to the Uniform Acts (and thus state versions of those
Acts) was meant to be interpreted narrowly. It was to be invoked only as
a discretionary safety valve to protect against enforcement that would
otherwise have sufficiently violated fundamental notions of what was
decent and just, so as to clearly show that recognition would seriously
"undermine 'that sense of security for individual rights, whether of
personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to
1
feel." 18
A. PriorActs Relied Upon by the Drafters
The Notes to the 1962 Act and the Commentary provide little
guidance as to what exactly constituted a judgment repugnant to public
policy." 9 However, the Prefatory Note to the 1962 Act provided that
"codification efforts made elsewhere have been taken into consideration,
in particular, the [British] Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement)
Act of 1933 and
a Model Act produced in 1960 by the International Law
20
Association.''
The [British] Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act
("British Act") contained a Public Policy exception to the enforcement
of a foreign judgment. The section read:
4. - (I) On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against
whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the
judgment -

(a) shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied116. Under Article 53 of the C.P.L.R., New York enacted its own version of the 1962 Uniform
Act. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1997). Article 53 (and thus the 1962 Uniform Act itself)
has subsequently been described as "principally a codification of pre-existing New York law."
Dresdner Bank AG v. Haque, 161 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Island Territory
of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973)). Inaddition, New
York is the home of two of the most influential cases regarding the exception: Loucks and
Bachchan.
117. See infra Part IV.D.
118. See 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007) (quoting Hunt v. BP
Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex. 1980)); Barbara Kulzer,
Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, 18 BUFF. L. REv. 1,33 (1969); infra Part IV.
119. PATCHEL, supra note 27, at 31. The comment following section 4 of the 1962 Act did
state that "a mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition"
under the Act. 1962 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt., 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 59.
120. 1962 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 41.
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(v) that the enforcement of the judgment would
be contrary to public
1 21
policy in the country of the registering court.
Like the 1962 Act, the British Act was based upon rules set forth in
the common law. Unlike the 1962 Act, the British Act's exception
dictated that the courts shall set aside any foreign judgments found to be
contrary to public policy; that is, there was no discretion.
By 1938, it was well-established that a foreign judgment would not
be enforced if it was found to be contrary to local public policy. 122 In
fact, under the common law of Britain, the scope of the exception was
quite large. 123 Foreign money judgments which imposed penalties or
involved taxes were not enforced because they were contrary to public
policy. 124 The public policy exception was also invoked if the action on
the original claim in the foreign country would have been illegal in the
local forum, and if the125"cause of action was [totally unknown] in the law
of the [local] forum.',
Professor Horace Read, in an invaluable 1938 survey of the British
common law, wrote that in order to properly invoke the exception the
cause of action needed to be unknown to the law of the forum and
contrary to an established policy of the forum. 126 Mere unfamiliarity
with the law was not likely to be enough to apply the exception.' 27 This
narrowing interpretation would prove important to the public policy
exception in the later 1962 Act.
In 1960, the Forty-Ninth Conference of the International Law
Association enacted the Foreign (Money) Judgments Act ("I.L.A.

121. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT) ACT, 1933 § 4(I)(a)(v) in 2
HARVARD STUDIES INTHE CONFLICT OF LAWS app. B, at 319 (1938) (emphasis added). As the name
of the Act suggests, one of the primary motivations behind the British Act was "to make provision
for the enforcement in the United Kingdom of judgments given in foreign countries which accord
reciprocal treatment to judgments given in the United Kingdom." Id. at 316 (introduction).
122. Read, supra note 15, at 288; see also Yntema, supra note 28, at 1159 (listing judgments
found to be repugnant to public policy as one exception to a 1920 act governing foreign judgment
recognition in the United Kingdom).
123. The modem public policy exception in Britain remains larger than its American
counterpart. See SCOLES, supranote 77, at 1333.
124. Read, supra note 15, at 288-90. The 1962 Act addressed both of these precedents by
excluding judgments for taxes, fines, or penalties from its definition of "foreign judgment." 1962
UNIF. ACT § 1(2), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 44. Judgments involving matrimonial or family matters were
also excluded. Id.
125. Read, supranote 15, at 292-93.
126. See id. at 295.
127. Id.
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Act"). 12 ' The I.L.A. Act contained a public policy exception to
recognition and enforcement that read, "A Foreign Judgment is
recognised by the forum as conclusive and is enforceable... except
where... (d) the foreign judgment is based upon a cause of action
which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." 129 Again
unlike the 1962 Act, the I.L.A. Act did not use discretionary language in
codifying the court's application of the exception to foreign judgments.
The intent behind the public policy exception was discussed in
great detail by the I.L.A. before its enactment. The exception was
described as a necessary and "universally recognized defence, a safety
valve, which appears in all the [Acts] already in force in this
field.. .. ",,' However, the Committee for the Enforcement of Foreign

Judgments debated the appropriateness of the phrase "contrary to the
strong public policy.'

31

It was suggested that the word "strong" be

deleted from the clause as unnecessary.! 32 One commentator even
33
suggested the entire exception be deleted as overly vague and elastic.
34
Those arguments were countered by Professor Kurt H. Nadelmann's1
explanation that, "we added the word 'strong' to 'public policy' in order
to indicate that a serious violation of the public policy of the forum must
be involved."' 135 After the debate a vote was held by the committee and
the phrase "strong public policy" remained in the final version of the
36
Act.

1

128. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Conflicts Drafts Adopted by the 49th Conference of the International
Law Association, Hamburg, 1960, 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 517, 517 (1960). Horace E. Read was the
chairman of the International Law Association's Enforcement of Foreign Judgments committee in
1960, and Kurt H. Nadelmann, the draftsman of the 1962 Act, was his Vice-Chairman. INT'L LAW
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE FORTY-NNTH CONFERENCE HELD AT HAMBURG, at L (1961) [hereinafter
1960 I.L.A. CONF.]. Both acted as draftsmen for the I.L.A. act. Nadelmann, Conflicts, supra, at 517.
129. THE FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT (1960) in 1960 I.L.A. CONF., supra note 128, at
316 (emphasis added). The Act was drafted without a reciprocity requirement and was meant to
provide direction to national draftsmen, specifically the draftsmen working with the National
Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.
Nadelmann, supranote 128, at 517.
130. 1960 I.L.A. CONF., supranote 128, at 308 (emphasis added).
131. Id.at296-308.
132. Id.at 296 ("I do not think it makes much difference whether or not the word 'strong' in
Art. 4 sub. (d) is omitted.").
133. Id. at297-98.
134. The draftsman of the 1962 Act.
135. 1960 IL.A. CONF., supra note 128, at 306. This interpretation was in accord with the then
present-day view of the exception. See id.
at 307; Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 15, at 970.
136. 1960 I.L.A.CONF., supra note 128, at 311.
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B. The N.CC. U.S.L. and the 1962 Act's Draftsmen
The legislative history of the 1962 Act can be traced back through
the Handbook of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. 137 The original suggestion to draft the 1962 Act was made in the
1957 Handbook, and Kurt H. Nadelmann's 1957 article in the Iowa Law
38
Review is specifically referenced as the basis for this suggestion.'
Nadelmann's article emphasized that, under the common law, American
courts granted "conclusive effect to foreign judgments," with an allowed
139
defense being "violation of the public policy of the forum."
Nadelmann did not further comment on the exception.
In 1958, the N.C.C.U.S.L. Handbook contained a "Report of
Special Committee on Uniform Recognition of Foreign Judgments Act,"
stating that a Uniform Act was both desirable and practicable. 40 The
committee's report cited to Willis L. M. Reese's 1950 article in the
Columbia Law Review when discussing the principles behind giving
conclusive effect to foreign judgments. 141 Reese's article discussed the
public policy exception at various points. He wrote that foreign
judgments were to be judged in accordance with state law, and thus the
public policy exception should be specific to the state forum.142 Reese
also wrote, in what is perhaps the greatest insight into the drafter's
intent, that:
[T]he defense must ...be available ....Thus, our courts should not

be required to enforce a judgment based upon a cause of action which
violated our fundamental notions of what is decent and just, or which
offends our laws.... The rule must therefore be that our courts will in

137. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT in 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 412
(1962) (see star footnote for legislative history of the 1962 Act). For further history on the 1962 Act,
see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND Proceedings OF THE ANNUAL
CONFERENCE MEETING 142-43 (1957) [hereinafter 1957 N.C.C.U.S.L. HANDBOOK]; NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND Proceedings OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING 151-52 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 N.C.C.U.S.L. HANDBOOK]; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND Proceedings OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 82, 242-45
(1962) [hereinafter 1962 N.C.C.U.S.L. HANDBOOK].
138. 1957 N.C.C.U.S.L. HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 142-43; see Nadelmann, supra note
115.
139. See Nadelmann, supra note 115, at 241.
140. 1958 N.C.C.U.S.L. HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 151-52.
141. Id. at 151; see Reese, supra note 28. Reese was Nadelmann's co-draftsman for the 1962
Act.

142.

See Reese, supra note 28, at 787.
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general enforce all foreign rights regardless of the [dissimilarity of the
law] under which acquired. Correctly regarded, the [public policy
exception] here discussed should be considered a safety
valve.., utilized only when necessary either to avoid offending
our
143
sense of morality or the integrity of our laws and institutions.
The exception was therefore to be invoked as a safety valve when
enforcement violated fundamental notions of what was decent and just.
Reese's usage of "fundamental notions" and offenses to morality appear
to provide ample room for courts to apply the exception. However,
Reese closed his discussion of the exception by emphasizing that "only a
real necessity to safeguard American citizens or institutions will be
sufficient to override the compelling reasons behind [enforcement].'"
C. The 1962 Act's Enactment in New York
In 1970, New York enacted its own version of the 1962 Act within
Article 53 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("C.P.L.R."), aptly titled
the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("New
York Act"). 145 The purpose behind enacting the New York Act was to
procure much better reciprocal enforcement of New York judgments in
foreign countries than they received at the time. 46 Indeed, in codifying
the decisional law of the state, the New York Act was meant to provide
statutory proof that New York liberally recognized foreign money
judgments. 47 It was also emphasized that New York courts were free to
exceed the terms of Article 53, by means of a savings clause, 148 to
provide additional
bases for the recognition of foreign money judgments
49
under the Act.'
By the time New York enacted Article 53, it was "the settled law ' of
50
this state that a foreign judgment [was] conclusive upon the merits.'
However, this rule was not absolute, and by 1970 the public policy
exception had long been part of the general rule of the state in regards to
143. Id. at 797.
144. Id. at 798.
145. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1997).
146. 1970 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2784 (McKinney).
147. Id.
148. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5307 (McKinney 1997) ("This article does not prevent the recognition of a
foreign country judgment in situations not covered by this article.") (emphasis added).
149. 1970 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2784 (McKinney).
150. Dunstan v. Higgins, 33 N.E. 729, 730 (N.Y. 1893); see Intercontinental Hotels Corp.
(P.R.) v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. 1964); Johnston v. Compagnie Gdn rale
Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1926); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201
(N.Y. 1918); Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 151 (1862).
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the recognition of foreign judgments. 15 1 Necessarily, the New York Act
contained a public policy exception at Section 5304(b)(4) of the
C.P.L.R. very similar to the exception contained in the 1962 Act. New
York's exception read as follows: "(b) Other grounds for nonrecognition. A foreign country judgment need not be recognized
the judgment is based is repugnant
if:... 4. the cause of action on which
' 52
state."'
this
of
policy
public
to the
New York's approach to the public policy exception traces back to
1862 and Lazier v. Wescott. 153 In Lazier, the Court of Appeals held that
foreign judgments were to be given conclusiveness unless the judgment
was "procured by fraud, or upon its face it was founded in mistake, or
that it is irregular and bad by the local law."' 54 Indeed, according to the
Lazier court absolute conclusiveness was favored for foreign judgments
except in the specific instances where non-recognition was necessary. 55
In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,156 Justice Cardozo concretely framed the
role the public policy exception would play for the next seventy years. In
Loucks, Justice Cardozo famously wrote that the public policy exception
provided courts the limited discretion to refuse to recognize a foreign
judgment if to do otherwise "would violate some fundamental principle
of good morals, some deep-rooted
of justice, some prevalent conception
157
tradition of the common weal."'
After Loucks, New York courts invoked the exception to deny
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments upon "a clear
showing that the enforcement... 'offend[s] our sense of justice or
menace[s] the public welfare."",158 The exception was therefore to be
invoked against judgments that were "inherently vicious, wicked or
immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense."' 59 Making this
determination meant reference to the laws of the forum, as well as
151. "A judgment recovered in a foreign country, when sued upon in the courts of this state, is
conclusive ...subject, however, to certain well-recognized exceptions, namely ...[judgments]
against the public policy of this state." Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 N.Y.S. 284,
286 (App. Div. 3d 1927).
152. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(4) (McKinney 1997). The only difference between the 1962 Act
and the New York Act is that the clause "[claim for relief]" was omitted from the New York statute.
See 1962 UNIF. ACT § 4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 59 (2002).
153. 26N.Y. 146 (1862).
at 153.
154. Id.
at 152.
155. Id.
156. 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
at 202.
157. Id.
158. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (P.R.) v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. 1964) (citation
omitted).
159. Id.
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incorporating the prevailing social and moral attitudes of the
community. 160 While a few lower courts invoked the exception, 16 1 the
Court of Appeals has strictly construed the exception by consistently
acknowledging
its existence and then ruling that the exception did not
62
apply.1
The Court of Appeals' approach to the public policy exception
closely mirrored the prevailing view among scholars regarding the
proper use of the exception. Professor Barbara Kulzer presented this
view to New York's C.P.L.R. advisory committee in 1970 at a
concurrent state Judicial Conference, at which the Judiciary was to
decide whether it would propose adopting the 1962 Act. 163 According to
Kuizer, though the public policy exception was universally allowed, the
exception was narrow because the policy behind invoking the exception
needed to be particularly violent to overcome the "'wider public policy
in favor of recognition.""164
Subsequently, in determining whether to enforce the foreign
judgment it was up to the court's discretion to weigh the strength of
local policy against the presumed justice of according recognition. 165
Importantly, Professor Kulzer emphasized that the exception was
properly discretionary because of the "wider public policy in favor of
recognition" and enforcement.' 66 Courts were to deny recognition only if
the policy violation was "particularly violent" and "closely related" to
fundamental notions "of fairness and justice.' 6 7
D. The 2005 Act and the Intent Behind "Repugnant to the Public
Policy of this State"
The 2005 Uniform Act, like its 1962 predecessor, also provides for
discretionary non-recognition of foreign judgments when the judgment
is found to be repugnant to the public policy of the state. However,

160. Id.at212-13.
161. See, e.g., In re Davis' Will, 219 N.Y.S.2d 533, 537 (Sur. Ct. 1961) (denying recognition
to a foreign judgment as against public policy because it was "rendered after the defendant's death
and without representation by his estate").
162. IntercontinentalHotels Corp., 203 N.E.2d at 212; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 130 N.E.2d
902, 903-04 (N.Y. 1955); Martens v. Martens, 31 N.E.2d 489, 490 (N.Y. 1940); Loucks, 120 N.E. at
202.
163. Kulzer, supra note 118; see also 1970 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2784 (McKinney) (citing Kulzer);
A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 5 reporter's note 6(a), supranote 16, at 72-73 (citing Kulzer).
164. Kulzer, supra note 118, at 32 (citation omitted).
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Seeid. at32-33.
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1165

unlike the 1962 Act, the drafters of the 2005 Act provided commentary
within the Act regarding the proper test for determining whether a
judgment was repugnant to the public policy of this state.
Like Kulzer, the drafters of the 2005 Act intended courts to invoke
the exception against judgments repugnant to the public policy of the
state only in the rarest of circumstances. Indeed, according to the
commentary to the 2005 Act, courts should apply a stringent test for the
public policy exception. 168 "Under [this] test, a difference in law, even a
marked one," is not enough to invoke the exception. 69 Instead:
Public policy is violated only if recognition or enforcement of the
foreign-country judgment would tend clearly to injure the public
health, the public morals, or the public confidence in the
administration of law, or would undermine "that sense of security for
liberty or of private property,
individual rights, whether of personal
170
which any citizen ought to feel."'
This test mirrors the surprisingly uniform and stringent tests adopted by
various states when addressing the public policy
courts across
17 1
exception.
The stringency of this test is consistent with the purpose behind
both Uniform Acts. Both Acts hoped to establish uniform and clear
standards under which state courts would enforce foreign-country
judgments.172 Through these uniform state enforcement standards, the
drafters of the 2005 Act hoped that it would be more likely that money
judgments rendered by U.S. courts would be recognized in foreign
countries. 173 The drafters believed that the more uniform and predictable
foreign judgment recognition became in the U.S., the less foreign courts
recognition to U.S. judgments due to the
would be inclined to deny
74
1
reciprocity.
doctrine of
at 13 (Supp. 2007).
168. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. 11,
169. Id.
170. Id.(quoting Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex.
1980)).
171.

PATCHEL, supra note 27, at 31; see also SarI Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489

F.3d 474, 479-80 (2d Cir. 2007) (New York); Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film, 25 F.3d 1512,
1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (Georgia); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971) (Pennsylvania); Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (California); Matusevitch v.
Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995) (District of Columbia); Hunt, 492 F. Supp. at 900-01
(Texas).
at 41 (2002) (Prefatory Note); 2005 UNIF.ACT
172. See 1962 UNIF.ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. I1,
at 5 (Supp. 2007) (Prefatory Note).
note, 13 U.L.A. pt. I1,
173. 2005 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. 11,at 5 (Supp. 2007) (Prefatory Note).
174. See id.
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Accordingly, because of this strong policy in favor of enforcement,
the overwhelming majority of state courts almost always recognize
foreign judgments, holding that the foreign judgment at issue is not
repugnant to public policy.1 75 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, by comparing the recognition of foreign judgments to those of
sister state judgments, also supports the tendency of courts to almost
76
categorically deny defendants the "safety valve" of the exception.'
E. The Non-Mandatory Public Policy Exception Under the 2005 Act
The 2005 Act (and the 1962 Act), on its face, does not provide for a
categorical, constitutionally mandatory public policy exception. Section
4 of the Act provides the Standards for Recognition of Foreign

Judgments.

77

Section 4(b) contains the mandatory grounds for non-

recognition of foreign judgments by American courts, including
judgments that violate the requirements of due process, and judgments in
which the foreign court lacked proper jurisdiction of the underlying
case.' 78 The section does not include the public policy exception.
Section 4(c) of the 2005 Act contains the non-mandatory or
discretionary grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments by
American courts. 179 The public policy exception is codified in Section
4(c)(3) of the 2005 Act.18 0 The discretionary nature of the 2005 Act's
public policy exception differs from other Acts codifying the exception.
As shown above, prior Foreign Judgments Acts provided mandatory
non-recognition to foreign judgments found to be repugnant to public

175. See Movsesian, supranote 36, at 71; Rosen, supra note 19, at 176.
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (1971); Rosen, supra
note 19, at 176. By comparing recognition of a foreign judgment to the recognition of judgments
between sister states, the Restatement's interpretation of the exception is so narrow as to be
practically non-existent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, at § 98 cmt. b (Supp.
1989); see also SCOLES, supra note 77, at 1335 ("In general, it appears to be the modem trend that
the public policy defense will lie only in exceptional cases, similar to its narrow scope in the
interstate setting.") (citation omitted).
177. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 11 (Supp. 2007).
178. Id. ("A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment if ..
(emphasis added); 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 3, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 12 (Supp. 2007) ("Subsection (b)
states three mandatory grounds for denying recognition to a foreign-country judgment.").
179. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(c), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 11 (Supp. 2007) ("A court of this state need
not recognize a foreign-country judgment if .. ") (emphasis added); 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 3,
13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 12 (Supp. 2007) ("Subsection (c) states eight nonmandatory grounds for denying
recognition.").
180. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(c), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at II (Supp. 2007).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/18

28

Mondora: The Public Policy Exception, "The Freedom of Speech, or of the Pr

2008]

PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

policy. 1 81 The A.L.I. Act also provided
mandatory non-recognition to
82
judgments violating public policy.
Antithetical to the 2005 Act, courts following Bachchan deem
themselves constitutionally mandated to categorically apply the
exception to deny recognition to foreign judgments impinging on First
Amendment rights. 83 This mandatory application of the public policy
exception effectively transforms the discretionary nature of the
exception into a Section 4(b) ground for non-recognition, where courts
"may not recognize a foreign judgment" if the ground for nonrecognition is met. 84 This transformation is inappropriate. The express
language of the public policy exception is discretionary and courts
interpreting
versions of the 2005 Act should apply the statutes as
18 5
written.
Statutory language aside, the history behind the public policy
exception shows that it was meant to be narrowly interpreted and
invoked only as a discretionary safety valve.' 86 This narrow
interpretation, and the pro-recognition sentiment behind it, does not
conflate with a categorical, mandatory public policy exception.
The 2005 Act emphasized that it contained only the minimum
standards for a foreign-country judgment to be recognized by the courts
of the adopting states.' 87 Courts were free to expand recognition and
enforcement to "other foreign-country [money] judgments not covered
by the Act under principles of comity or otherwise."' 88 The 1962 Act
also delineated that state courts were privileged to give foreign money
181. See supra Part IV.A.
182. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
183. See Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 2007)
("Foreign judgments that impinge on First Amendment rights will be found to be 'repugnant' to
public policy.") (emphasis added)); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662
(Sup. Ct. 1992).
184. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(b), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 11 (Supp. 2007) ("A court of this state may not
recognize a foreign-country judgment if .. ")(emphasis added).
185. Section 482(2) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law contains a public
policy exception nearly identical to that contained within the 2005 Act. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d) (1987) ("A court... need not recognize a [foreign
judgment] if: ...(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is
repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the State where recognition is sought.")
(emphasis added). Additionally, Comment (a) of Section 482 states that "court[s] [are] not required
to deny recognition" to judgments under Subsection (2). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. a (1987). The Restatement attributes its distinction between mandatory
(subsection 1) and discretionary (subsection 2) grounds for recognition directly to Section 4 of the
Uniform Act(s). Id.
186. See supra Part IV.
187. 2005 UNiF.ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 5 (Supp. 2007) (Prefatory Note).
188. See id.
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judgments greater, not less, effect than the local forum was required to
do by the provisions of the Act. 189 In New York, the legislature-in
enacting its version of the 1962 Act-intended to provide statutory proof
that New York liberally recognized foreign money judgments. 190 In fact,
the legislative history made clear that New York courts were free to
exceed the terms of Article 53 to provide additional bases for the
recognition of foreign money judgments under the Act.191 Bachchan's
expansion of the exception to provide mandatory non-recognition of
foreign judgments, under the auspices of a non-mandatory public policy
exception, is thus directly adverse to the policy favoring recognition
underlying all three of these Acts.
A non-mandatory public policy exception is also consistent with
modem notions of the comity doctrine. This is particularly important
because American courts oftentimes make recognition determinations
based on a comity theory. 192 Comity has been defined as "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens,
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."' 193 The
modem basis for the comity doctrine is that of "obligation, requiring
U.S. courts to defer to foreign sovereigns and to the executive in the
conduct of foreign relations."'1 94 American courts thereby almost always
recognize foreign judgments. 195 The categorical, mandatory nonrecognition of foreign judgments under the Bachchan line of cases is not
consistent with this notion of comity, and would undoubtedly expand the
use of the public policy exception by American courts to deny
recognition to foreign judgments.

189. 1962 UNIF. ACT note, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 40 (2002) (Prefatory Note).
190. 1970 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2784 (McKinney).
191. Id.
192. Movsesian, supra note 36, at 71; See, e.g., Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film, 25 F.3d
1512, 1519-21 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
193. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
194. Paul, supra note 29, at 12, 25-26.
195. See Movsesian, supranote 36, at 71; Rosen, supranote 19, at 176.
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V.

A PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND A SUGGESTED JUDICIAL
APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

A. A ProposedAmendment to State Versions of the 2005 Act
Section 4 provides the exclusive grounds for non-recognition of
foreign judgments under the 2005 Act. 9 6 Thus, for those who believe
the First Amendment will always trump any policy in favor of
enforcement, 97 this Note proposes that one solution to Bachchan's
problematic invocation of the public policy exception would be to create
a mandatory ground for non-recognition, separate and apart from the
public policy exception, within Section 4(b) of state versions of the 2005
Act. The proposed statutory amendment would provide for mandatory
non-recognition if the "judgment or [cause of action] [claim for relief]
on which the judgment is based is found to impinge upon the rights to
freedom of speech and press embodied in the state or United States
Constitutions.' ' 198 The amendment would thus succeed in providing
Bachchan's mandatory, categorical protections, 199 by separating the
public policy exception from First Amendment analysis.2 °0
It is important to note that the creation of this amendment would
not undermine the relevance of the public policy exception. Rather, it
highlights the role the exception can play in foreign judgment
recognition law; that is, the exception may be utilized as a tool to
identify foreign judgments that warrant categorical, mandatory nonrecognition. In the Bachchan line of cases, the exception acted first as a
safety valve against judgments that impinge on rights protected by the
First Amendment. And, in enacting the proposed amendment, a state's

196. See 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(a), 13 U.L.A. pt II, at 11 (Supp. 2007); 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt.
3, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 12 (Supp. 2007) ("Subsection 4(a) places an affirmative duty on the forum
court to recognize a foreign-country money judgment unless one of the grounds for nonrecognition
stated in subsection (b) or (c) applies."); see also Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 884-85 (4th
Cir. 1992) (stating that the 1962 Act's Section 4 defenses-as enacted by Maryland-were the only
means for denying recognition to foreign judgments).
197. See 2002 Proceedings, supra note 82, at 365 ("1 find it hard to believe that the public
policy emanating from the Constitution will not always trump the public policy in favor of
enforcement ....
") (quoting Professor Brand). But see Stem, supra note 77, at 1033 ("The First
Amendment does not fundamentally and directly protect all manner of expression regardless of
person, circumstance, and content.").
198. Cf 2003 Proceedings, supra note 82, at 146 ("Are you suggesting we simply say
judgments for defamation are not enforceable?") (quoting Professor Lowenfeld).
199. If this statutory amendment does not seem like an appropriate addition to the law of
foreign judgment recognition, then, this author proffers, neither should Bachchan.
200. See supra Part llI.B.3.
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legislature would thereby acknowledge that the policies underlying the
Bachchan line of cases are strong enough that codification, and thus
categorical, mandatory non-recognition, is proper.
In January 2008, a bill was introduced in both houses of the New
York legislature that would amend the New York Act to expressly deal
with the recognition of foreign defamation judgments.20 ' The bill,
entitled the Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 20 2 would amend Section
5304(b) of the New York Act to provide that a foreign judgment need
not be recognized if:
[T]he cause of action resulted in a defamation judgment obtained in a
jurisdiction outside the United States, unless the court before which the
matter is brought sitting in this state first determines that the
defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication provided at
least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as
would be provided
by both the United States and New York
2 3
Constitutions. 0
This Note suggests that any amendment providing for the nonrecognition of judgments that violate "the freedom of speech and press
as provided for by both the United States and [state] constitutions"
should not limit its protections to judgments based only upon
defamation. Instead, the amendment should provide for the nonrecognition of all foreign judgments impinging on rights protected by
the freedom of speech and press embodied in the state or United States
Constitutions. Indeed, the Viewfinder decision itself, based upon the free
speech protections provided by copyright's fair use doctrine, is proof
that an amendment protecting only libel judgments is under-inclusive.

201. Assemb. S06687-C, 2008 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
202. Id. The Libel Terrorism Protection Act was proposed to effectively overrule the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 506-07 (2007). See
Memorandum, Sen. Dean Skelos, N.Y. State Senate Introducer's Memorandum in Support of
S06687-C (2008). In Ehrenfeld, a New York plaintiff filed suit in New York, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the foreign defamation judgment obtained against her in a British court would not be
recognized in New York. See Ehrenfeld, 9 N.Y.3d at 506. The Court of Appeals dismissed the suit
on personal jurisdiction grounds, holding that the English defendant did not fall under the reach of
New York's long arm statute. Id. at 507. The bill, in addition to amending Section 5304 of the N.Y.

C.P.L.R., also amends New York's personal jurisdiction statute to allow New York plaintiffs such
as Ehrenfeld to obtain a declaration of non-recognition in New York courts. See Assemb. S06687-C,
2008 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008). For commentary on the Libel Terrorism Protection Act and
the Ehrenfeld decision, see Thomas F. Gleason, Who Should Fix the Libel Tourism Problem?, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 17, 2008, at 3; Joel Stashenko, Albany Bill Would Grant 'Libel Terrorism' Jurisdiction,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 2008, at 1, 7.
203. Assemb. S06687-C, 2008 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
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Importantly, the Second Circuit's analysis in Viewfinder provides
the proper judicial analysis for courts interpreting the suggested
amendment to the Uniform Acts.2 °4 In Viewfinder, the court laid out a
two-step test for determining whether foreign money judgments were
repugnant to the public policy of New York.20 5 First, courts must
identify the First Amendment protections-in Viewfinder, the First
Amendment protections contained within copyright's fair use doctrinedeemed constitutionally mandatory for the speech at issue; second,
courts must determine whether the substantive foreign laws underlying
the foreign judgment provide comparable protections.20 6 The Second
Circuit indicated that if Viewfinder's use was found to be a fair use
under United States copyright law, then the French foreign money
judgments
at issue were to be held repugnant to the public policy of New
7
20

York.

This test, and indicated outcome, would be entirely appropriate if
utilized to interpret the amendment proposed above.20 8 Thus, courts
interpreting the proposed amendment would first identify the First
Amendment protections deemed constitutionally mandatory for the
speech at issue, then determine whether the substantive foreign laws
underlying the foreign judgment provided comparable protections. 2°9 If
the judgment, or cause of action underlying the judgment, impinged on
the rights to the freedom of speech and press embodied in the state or
United States Constitutions then the foreign judgment would not be
recognized.

204. See supra, Part II.C. Viewfinder does not, however, provide for the proper judicial
approach to courts invoking the public policy exception.
205. The Viewfinder court bases its test on the analysis undertaken in Bachchan. Sari Louis
Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2007). Because the Comment to the
2005 Act cites to Bachchan, Viewfinder's test effectively determines whether a foreign judgment is
repugnant to the public policy of the United States. See 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II,
at 13 (Supp. 2007).
206. Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 481-82.
207. See id.
at 483.
208. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text. The proposed statutory amendment
would provide for mandatory non-recognition if the "judgment or [cause of action] [claim for relief]
on which the judgment is based is found to impinge upon the rights to free speech in this state or the
United States." 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(c)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 11 (Supp. 2007). This author proposes
that Viewfinder be specifically referenced as the representative case for courts interpreting this
amendment.
209. Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 481-82.
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B. A Suggested Approach to the PublicPolicy Exception
Viewfinder's test, while appropriate for the proposed amendment,

does not provide the proper judicial approach for courts invoking the
public policy exception under the 2005 Act. Instead, courts interpreting
the 2005 Act should incorporate constitutional principles into the public
policy exception, rather than allow the public policy exception to be
subsumed by constitutional analysis. This Part will apply the suggested
approach to the facts of Viewfinder. In so doing, this analysis will

attempt to reconcile the belief that the First Amendment does not
directly preclude the recognition of foreign judgments210 with the belief
that public policy may be found by examining constitutional norms.2 11
As stated above, the public policy exception should be interpreted

narrowly. It should only be invoked only as a discretionary safety valve
to protect against judgments that sufficiently violate fundamental
notions of what is decent and just, so as to clearly show that recognition
would seriously undermine "that sense of security for individual rights,

whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen
ought to feel.

212

Within this analysis, public policy may be found by

examining constitutional norms,213 and foreign judgments that impinge
on rights protected by the First Amendment could sufficiently violate
notions of what was decent and just.2 14 However, in making this
determination courts should act consistently with the strong policy
favoring recognition underlying the 1962 and 2005 Acts. 1 5
Viewfinder is a New York case involving plaintiffs seeking

recognition of foreign judgments under New York's version of the 1962
Act. Accordingly, courts in New York should also require that the public

210. See generally Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997) (denying recognition to
a foreign libel judgment on public policy grounds without deciding whether the First Amendment
directly precluded recognition).
211. Id. at 239 ("[1]n ascertaining ...public policy, it is appropriate to examine and rely upon
the history, policies, and requirements of the First Amendment ....In determining nonconstitutional principles of law, courts often rely upon the policies and requirements reflected in
constitutional provisions."); see Morris B. Chapman & Assoc., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 739 N.E.2d 1263,
1270 (111.2000); Martino v. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc., 554 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 688 (N.Y. 1985); PATCHEL, supranote
27, at 32.
212. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
213. See Ben-Ezer & Bendor, supra note 21, at 2140; Berman, supranote 20, at 1872.
214. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007) (quoting Hunt v. BP
Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex. 1980)); see supra note 118 and
accompanying text; supra Part IV.
215. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
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policy violation be violent to the state or the United States.2 16 Again,
while First Amendment violations could rise to this level of public
policy violation, the strong policy in favor of recognition underlying the
New York Act dictates that foreign judgments must do more than
impinge on First Amendment rights, per se, in order to invoke the
exception. To reach this level of public policy violation, courts should
also take into account the interests of the state and the United States at
stake in the litigation217 by examining the specific parties before them.21 8
Questions that may be used to determine the relevant amount of interest
include: whether a business is incorporated in the United States; whether
either of the parties are United States citizens or legal United States
residents; the financial interests at stake and whether the parties conduct
a substantial amount of business within the country; whether the speech
at issue targets a United States audience; and how much of the conduct
giving rise to the litigation occurred within the country. This list is by no
means exhaustive, but the greater the state or the United States interest at
stake, the stronger the violation of public policy.
The above list mirrors many of the factors for determining
"reasonableness" in regards to a (sovereign) State's limitations on
jurisdiction to prescribe. 219 This jurisdiction entails the ability of that
country to make its law applicable in a transnational context.220 The
public policy exception is used in the 1962, 2005, and New York Acts as
a defense arising in private litigation, not public law.22 ' However, the

216. See supraPart IV.C.
217. See A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 5 reporter's note 6(d), supra note 16, at 78; Berman,
supranote 20, at 1872; Silberman & Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 644.
218. See Walters, supra note 58, at 899 (arguing that recognition determinations should be
made on a case-by-case basis).
219.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (1987). Section 403(2)

lists eight factors, including:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted ....
Id.
220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, at Part IV (1987) (Introductory
Note).
221. This Note deals specifically with determining when the public policy of the United States
warrants that a foreign-country money judgment may be denied recognition through private
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constitutionally mandatory, categorical denial of recognition to foreign
judgments under the Bachchan line of cases does raise some of the same
issues as a state exercising prescriptive jurisdiction. 22 This Note
consequently proposes that courts interpreting the public policy
exception in cases such as Bachchan should draw upon the factors listed
above, and those listed for the principle of reasonableness in the
Restatement, to help make their recognition determinations.223
In applying the suggested approach to Viewfinder, the court's
analysis would still include a determination of whether the defendant's
free speech rights were impinged upon by the foreign judgments.2 24 The
rights protected by the doctrine of fair use would be identified, and the
court would determine whether the protections given to the substantive
foreign laws underlying the foreign judgment provide comparable
protections. 225 However, if the court determines that the foreign
judgment impinges upon First Amendment rights by violating a
defendant's right to fair use, non-recognition is not then deemed to be
constitutionally mandatory. Instead, the court would proceed to
determine the state or United States interests at stake in recognizing the
judgment. 226 In Viewfinder, defendant is a website operator, incorporated
227
in Delaware, with its principal place of business in New York.
Defendant's website content was presumably targeted towards a United
States audience.228 Thus, there appears to be sufficient United States
litigation. The principle of reasonableness under the Restatement determines when a sovereign state
may apply its law to foreign actors.
222. Indeed, the Commentary to the Restatement states that "[slome United States courts have
applied the principle of reasonableness as a requirement of comity ... reflecting a sense of
obligation among states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 cmt. a (1987).
223. For an expanded discussion of interational jurisdiction, free speech, and the Internet, see
Cherie Dawson, Note, Creating Borders on the Internet: Free Speech, the United States, and
InternationalJurisdiction,44 VA. J. INT'L L. 637 (2004).
224. See Sari Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2007).
225. See id. at 481-82. Note that the rights protected by the First Amendment would merely be
identified, not deemed constitutionally mandatory.
226. See supranotes 216-25 and accompanying text.
227. 489 F.3d at 476.
228. See Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 704-06 (arguing that both Bachchan and Yahoo!
involved liability for speech to a foreign audience, yet neither opinion offered support for the
controversial proposition that limiting speech directed abroad is an effect that comes within the
ambit of the First Amendment). Van Houweling's argument focuses upon the extraterritorial
application of the First Amendment. See id. at 705 n.34. Specifically, the belief that it is unclear
whether "the First Amendment (and, hence, First Amendment-based public policy) protects speech
directed to a foreign audience." Id. at 705. For a contrary view, see Sanders, supra note 95, at 552
("It is acceptable for a court to extend First Amendment protection without a detailed explanation
about why it is doing so because this is consistent with the general constitutional presumption that
expression is protected.").
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interests at stake to find that the foreign judgment, in impinging upon the
rights protected by the First Amendment, sufficiently violates notions of
what is decent and just, so as to clearly show that recognition would
seriously undermine "'that sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal
liberty or of private property, which any citizen
' 229
feel."'
to
ought
One case that most likely lacks the requisite nexus to United States
interests is Telnikoff v. Matusevitch.2 3 ° Indeed, at the commencement of
the dispute, the plaintiff in Telnikoff was an English citizen working in
Munich, Germany. 23 1 The defendant in the case was a journalist working
in Europe and had not resided in the United States for over forty
years.232 The speech at issue was a letter written by the defendant that
was published in London's Daily Telegraph in February 1984.233
Like much of public policy analysis, determining the interest at
stake in recognizing a foreign judgment may seem an unsafe judicial
task.234 If done carefully however, courts will be able to use their
discretion to invoke the public policy exception as the "safety valve," or
last resort, to the recognition of foreign judgments it was intended to
be, 235 rather than as a mandatory chute for all judgments that impinge
upon rights protected by the First Amendment.2 36
VI.

CONCLUSION

A number of factors are converging to increase the practical
importance of how courts apply the public policy exception. First, the
Internet continues to raise the stakes for the United States recognition of

229. 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007) (quoting Hunt v. BP
Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex. 1980)); see supra note 118 and
accompanying text; see also supra Part IV.
230. 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997); see also Berman, supra note 20, at 1872 (arguing that the libel
judgment at issue in Telnikoffwould not have been sufficiently repugnant to United States "public
policy because neither party had any particular affiliation with the United States").
231. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 232.
232. Id.
233. Id.at 232-34.
234. See Read, supra note 15, at 288; Sanders, supra note 95, at 552 ("[W]hen a court limits
the First Amendment, its obligation to explain itself is heightened.").
235. See Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 886 (4th Cir. 1992); PATCHEL, supra note 27,
at 34-35; Reese, supra note 28, at 797; see also Minehan, supra note 15, at 818 (arguing that the
exception "serves as a 'safety valve' for unforeseeable changes in the law"); Zekoll, supranote 77,
at 1305 ("Rather than treating public policy as an instrument of last resort, the court required, in
essence, that the foreign court emulate every detail of American constitutional jurisprudence ....
236. See supraPart II.B-C.
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foreign judgments, 237 as American free speech protections collide with
foreign judgments arising out of online activities.238 Under state versions
of the Uniform Acts, the public policy exception will play a central role
in determining whether foreign judgments can survive the impact of the
First Amendment. Second, the A.L.I.'s recent attempt at federal
legislation regarding foreign judgment recognition has thus far failed,
and congressional enactment of a national solution to foreign judgment
recognition seems dubious at best.239 Third, the academic response to the

Bachchan line of cases has become increasingly ambivalent. 240 And
finally, because of the recent passage of the 2005 Act, states will soon be
enacting and interpreting updated versions of foreign judgment
recognition acts.241
The N.C.C.U.S.L., in drafting the 2005 Act, has attempted to quell
the debate over the exception. Under the 2005 Act's expanded public
policy exception, 242 and the Commentary to the 2005 Act,2 43 if a foreign
judgment impinges upon rights protected by the First Amendment, then
the refusal to recognize the judgment will be deemed "constitutionally
mandatory." 2 " The 2005 Act as a whole is a step forward for the
American recognition of foreign judgments. 4 5 Indeed, four states have
already enacted the 2005 Act.246 Unfortunately however, the 2005 Act's

express approval of Bachchan's use of the public policy exception is a
step in the wrong direction.

237.

See Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 716 ("The internet... raises the stakes for

domestic enforcement of foreign judgments.").
238. See A.L.I. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 5 reporter's note 6(d), supranote 16, at 79-80.
239. See Richard J. Graving, The Carefully Crafted 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act Cures a Serious Constitutional Defect in Its 1962 Predecessor, 16

MICH.ST. J. INT'L L. 289, 302 (2007) ("[C]ongressional enactment of a national solution [to foreign
judgment recognition] is for now a dubious prospect.").
240. See supra Part 1Il.
241. For an updated listing of states that have enacted the 2005 Act, see
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufcmjra.asp (last visited May
26, 2008).
242. A foreign judgment need not be recognized by a state court if "the judgment or the [cause
of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this
state or of the United States." 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4(c)(3), 13 U.L.A. pt. II, at 11 (Supp. 2007).
243. See 2005 UNIF. ACT § 4 cmt. 8, 13 U.L.A.pt. II, at 13 (Supp. 2007).
244. See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S. 661, 662 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
245. See Graving, supra note 239, at 302 (arguing that the 2005 Act is a "distinct improvement
on its 1962 predecessor" and "deserves to be adopted in all U.S. jurisdictions").
246. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1713-1724 (West Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 10-1401
to -1410 (Supp. 2007); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 691.1131-1143 (effective Mar. 7, 2008), availableat
http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-Act-20-of-2008; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.700-.820
(West Supp. 2008).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/18

38

Mondora: The Public Policy Exception, "The Freedom of Speech, or of the Pr

2008]

PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

This Note has shown that there is no statutory or historical basis
under the 1962 and 2005 Acts for a categorical, constitutionally
mandatory public policy exception to the recognition of foreign-country
money judgments. If the mandates of the First Amendment must be
protected absolutely, then that protection should be provided within state
acts separate from the public policy exception.2 47 Until that is possible,
courts should apply the public policy exception as it was intended to be
applied: a narrowly interpreted discretionary safety valve, invoked only
to protect against judgments that sufficiently violate fundamental
notions of what is decent and just, so as to clearly show that recognition
would seriously undermine "that sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen
ought to feel., 2 4 8 This analysis may prove the old adage true, 249 but it
will also provide a safer, more settled law to the United States
recognition of foreign judgments over time.
Charles W. Mondora*

247. See supraPart V.A.
248. See supranote 118 and accompanying text; supra Part V.B.
249. See Read, supra note 15, at 288 (describing the public policy exception to foreign
judgment recognition as "a dangerous horse to ride").
* I would like to offer my warm thanks first to the Managing Board of the Hofstra Law
Review, Renato D. Matos, lrina
Boulyjenkova, and Kathleen Dreyfus Bardunias, for their fantastic
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